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dieses zugleich zum spezifisch transzendentalen Bestimmen. So erreicht Vf. schlieBlich dennoch qua Topik den apodiktischen Charakter aller echten Transzendentalphilosophie!
III. Aus Probe wie Gegenprobe folgt somit gleichermaBen, daB die Darleg~ngen
des Vf. nicht den mindesten AufschluB uber Methode und Argumentation der transzendentalen Erkenntnis zu geben vermogen. Ein Rekurs auf die fur "reputable Meinungen" (S. 207) zustandige "Topik" kann allenfalls fur das Verstandnis der Diskussionslage oder der kommunikativen Situation hilfreich sein, die zum einen Kants
Unternehmen einer Kritik der reinen Vernunft veranla{5t, aber per se keineswegs
philosophisch nezessitiert hat. Zum anderen mag sie als Instrumentarium gebraucht
werden, den - unweigerlich faktisch-empirisch gepragten - Gang der Rezeption
des Kritizismus zu beschreiben. Dabei konnte sie dann durchaus den Status reflexiver Hermeneutik beanspruchen (vgl. KrV B 7661767, B 780).
1m Zusammenhang mit den mitunter arg topischen Verlaufen der Rezeption seiner kritischen Philo sophie hat ubrigens Kant gelegentlich seinen transzendentalen
Ansatz uber den gelaufigen Standard der einfuhrenden Partien der Kritik der reinen
Vernrenft hinaus erlautert. Dies geschieht vor allem in seiner Streitschrift gegen
Eberhard (Uber eine Entdeckung, nach der aile neue Kritikder reinen Vernunft
durch eine altere entbehrlich gemacht werden soli). Eine wirkliche Arbeit uber Methode und Argumentation in Kants kritischer Philo sophie konnte sich - worauf
etwa auch H. E. Allison hingewiesen hat - diese wertvollen Handreichungen zunutze machen.
So gehort Leitners Buch zur langen (und taglich wundersam wachsenden) Liste
von Arbeiten, die ungeachtet ihrer durchaus zu wurdigenden Bemuhungen im EinzeInen, das Ganze der Aufgabe verfehlt haben und verfehlen muBten, wei I sie durch
fundamentale Ebenenverwechslung (hier sogar durch mehrfache) dem Kern des kritizistischen Ansatzes nicht gerecht geworden - ja ihm sogar planmaBig ausgewichen - sind. Diese viele auch bekannte Autorennamen umfassende Liste verdient
die Gattungsbezeichnung "lectiones Kanti ut non-Kanti". Man kann diese auch als
Variable lesen, denn mit anderen PhilosophiegroBen, etwa Wittgenstein und Heidegger, wird eine ebenso muntere "doctrina ignorans" getrieben.
Manfred Gawlina, Munchen und Neapel

Kant's moral theory through this book. Even so, the space saved does not seem
worth the inconvenience created for students or other readers who on basis of
Sullivan's text want to explore some specific aspects of Kant's work beyond the
Foundations.
Sullivan's book has ten short chapters. In the first chapter, he introduces Kant's
moral theory on basis of his political theory, writing that this format "has proved
extraordinarily helpful to my students in illuminating just those parts of Kant's
moral theory that are usually the hardest for them to comprehend and appreciate"
(p. 1). Sullivan describes Kant as a liberal thinker committed to the rule of law, the
right of each individual to pursue his own conception of happiness, and the idea
that each person has dignity based on his capacity for moral autonomy. Sullivan
shows that Kant's liberal commitments led him to formulate the Universal Principle
of Justice as the foundation of the good society, but, adhering to a formalist reading
of Kant, he nonetheless claims that "an appeal to the principle of noncontradiction
'" proves the correctness of the Universal Principle" (p. 13). He further characterizes Kant as a classical liberal who viewed the task of the government as fundamentally negative, apparently giving little significance to the latter's claim that it is the
duty of the state "to maintain those members of the society who are unable to
maintain themselves" (Ak VI, 326).
Sullivan proceeds to sketch how Kant's liberal ideas shaped his moral thought.
He also argues that the tyranny of Frederick the Great and Machiavelli's work
significantly influenced Kant's moral thought. Here the links are less convincing or
illuminating. Sullivan maintains, for example, that Kant learned from Machiavelli
that "people have engaged in all sorts of conduct," and that, therefore, "moral
norms cannot be based on experience" (p.22). A more serious problem is that
Sullivan fails to make clear how his linking of Kant's political and moral thought
is to be interpreted: Is it a reconstruction, a mere mode of exposition chosen for
pedagogical purposes, or an account of how Kant's political convictions and experiences actually informed his ethics? Sullivan seems to pursue all three, and this invites misunderstanding. He rightly notes that the Universal Principle of Justice must
bring harmony between human beings with diverse conceptions of happiness and
that the categorical imperative in the Foundations has a similar purpose. However,
it must be confusing for beginning students to read that "in the Foundations Kant
restated [the Universal Principle of Justice] so it would apply not only to our behavior but also to our aims and motives" (p. 28; my emphasis).
Chapters 2 -6 discuss, respectively, Kant's explication and justification of the categorical imperative, the universal-law formula, the formula of respect for persons,
the formula of the realm of ends, and the "limits of the categorical imperative."
These chapters, with the exception of the last one, are primarily expository. In my
view, a more critical approach is preferable. Of course, an introductory text should
not so much engage in critical analysis that the main picture might be lost or that
students are left wondering why they should study the philosopher under discussion, but Sullivan at times ignores clear gaps or problems in Kant's arguments. Thus
Sullivan simply restates, for instance, Kant's inadequate argument that since the
good will is motivated by duty rather than by realizing some end of the inclinations,
the good will must be guided by the universal-law formula of the categorical imperative. Certainly, this argument must come as a surprise to students who define their

Roger]. Sullivan: An Introduction to Kant's Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1994, viii + 183 pages.
This solid but accessible and clearly-written introduction to Kant's ethics draws
at times heavily from Sullivan's more technical and comprehensive Immanuel Kant's
Moral Theory (1989). The introductory work, however, fully stands on its own
with one unfortunate exception: Only citations from the Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals are referenced; with regard to all other citations from Kant's
work, Sullivan states (p. 2) that the references can be found in the "relevant sections" of his 1989 work. What seems to have motivated Sullivan to adopt this
reference procedure is that his exposition of Kant's ethics is centered around the
.Foundations and aimed primarily at undergraduate students who are introduced to
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good character, say, in terms of a commitment to the Golden Rule or the Ten
Commandments. Other examples are that Sullivan hardly addresses the many difficulties involved in formulating maxims and that he does not assess Kant's doctrine
of natural ends (teleology). A more critical approach, I think, would not only stimulate beginning students to become engaged in critical assessment of Kant's ethics,
but would also provide an opportunity to discuss how Kant's work has led to a
diverse Kantian tradition in ethics.
In his discussion of the universal-law for~ula, Sullivan insists that the "ultimate
moral norm is a purely formal law, completely empty of all content, ... showing
its roots in the logical principle of noncontradiction" (p. 41). Relatedly, he claims
that the denial of the moral law "results in a practical incoherency" (p. 35) and
that even though "the Categorical Imperative requires us to assess the consequences
of the adoption of a particular maxim, it is concerned only with the formal or
logical consequences" (p. 51). Sullivan's use of the term "logical" is puzzling here,
for in testing the universalizability of a maxim one must hypothetically consider
what the empirical consequences of its universal adoption would be. Further, a
"practical contradiction" emerges only if one accepts the idea that maxims should
be universalizable and then proposes to act on a non-universalizable maxim. The
person who rejects the universal-law formula altogether and acts on a non-universalizable maxim is not engaged in a "practical absurdity" (p. 22). What needs to be
shown is why we should be committed to this formula. What justifies the formula?
Sullivan's introductory chapter provides an answer - the formula is the constitutive
principle of the ideal community of free rational agents - but his formalist interpretation prevents him from explicitly defending it.
In the chapter on the "limits of the categorical imperative," Sullivan argues that
"the Categorical Imperative does not offer us a recipe for making our specific moral
decisions" (p. 94) and must instead be seen as a procedure for determining general
moral rules that require moral judgment for their application to specific situations.
One attractive feature of this interpretation is that it solves the problem of ethical
rigorism: Moral rules are valid without exception, but in a particular situation one
may judge that one rule overrides another relevant rule. Applying this insight to
Kant's infamous On a SU12Posed Right to Lie from Altruistic Motives, it follows
that the maxim of lying is always immoral, but we may lie in order to save a life.
Sullivan adds: "The problem is that here, as elsewhere, Kant did not clearly distinguish between judging the moral quality of a maxim and judging how to act in a
particular instance" (p. 103). Another strength of Sullivan's view of the limits of
the categorical imperative is that it makes Kant's claim more plausible that the
demands of morality are clear to common human reason. The claim applies only
to general moral rules; error, moral disagreement, and the like, emerge primarily
with respect to judgments of how to apply these rules (d. p. 105). One price paid,
however, is that Sullivan significantly restricts the scope of Kantian ethics, especially
since he denies the possibility of substantive Kantian guidelines for making particular moral judgments (see p. 39-41).
Chapter 7 discusses how Kant developed the distinction between prudence and
morality, while chapter 8 addresses his view of moral character, nonmoral feelings,
and respect for the moral law and other moral feelings. Sullivan corrects in the
latter chapter the wrong impression created by the Foundations that actions done

out of sympathy lack moral worth. Kant's real view is that those actions have worth
if undertaken by a person who has made a basic commitment to the moral law.
This commitment then plays the crucial role of constraining or re-directing natural
sympathy where morally necessary, as in the case when compassion for someone
might lead one to violate that person's autonomy (see p. 146).
Chapter 9 offers an inventory of Kantian duties by addressing three questions:
What is the ideal political society? What kind of person should we become? How
should our personal relationships be? Sullivan sketches here the ideal Kantian agent
as a very gradualist liberal thinker, who treasures friendship and marriage, pursues
happiness within moral limits, and helps others in need. There is something fundamental missing from this picture: The Kant who was enthusiastic about the French
Revolution, condemned colonialism with sarcasm, disapproved of both standing
and paid armies, or held that all property is provisional until the realization of the
federation of states. Admittedly, this radical dimension of Kant does not translate
into specific duties in his work, but this is an issue that deserves to be discussed in
an introductory text on his ethics.
The final chapter of Sullivan's book analyzes the third section of the Foundations
and is followed by "Suggestions for Further Reading." Sullivan notes that "[f]rom
the very beginning, Kant's ideas engendered an enormous secondary literature as
well as differing interpretations of those ideas" (p. 175); yet, he limits his suggested
readings to recent works by Anglo-American scholars.
Notwithstanding its shortcomings, Sullivan's book would be a good addition to
any course that discusses the Foundations in detail. The book will help students in
understanding this difficult text and provide them with a broader and richer picture
of Kant's ethics than they would obtain from the Foundations alone, for, where
necessary, Sullivan pays ample and careful attention to such works as the second
Critique, The Metaphysics of Morals, and Religion within the Limits of Reason
Alone.
Harry van der Linden, Indianapolis

Markku Leppakoski: The Transcendental How. Kant's Transcendental Deduction
of Objective Cognition. Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell International 1993,
280 pages.
This work is a doctoral dissertation defended in 1993 at the University of Stockholm. Its main topic is Kant's theory of synthetic judgments a priori. The central
thesis which the author argues for is that Kant was largely interested in the question
of how it is possible to establish or to justify some synthetic judgments in an a priori
fashion. Leppakoski interprets this question to be a "how" -question in contrast to
a "that"-question, and he holds that he is in accord here with Kant's own distinction
between "how"- and "that"-questions (about which more below). Given this conviction, the title of this study is well chosen. The author believes that if transcendental idealism is true, then the answer to the pertinent "that" -question follows, i. e.,
the truth of Kant's idealism shows that some synthetic judgments are possible a
priori. In contrast, to answer the corresponding "how"-question is to provide an
account of how transcendental idealism can be established.

